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Abstract: Several surveys on intra-industry dynamics have recently reached the conclusion from a 
large body of evidence that Gibrat’s Law does not hold, i.e., the main finding is that firm growth 
decreases with firm size. However, almost all of these studies have been based on manufacturing. In 
this paper - in search of further evidence supporting the results recently obtained for a large sample 
of Dutch firms in the hospitality industry - we examine whether the assumption that growth rates 
are independent of firm size can be rejected for the services, as it has been for manufacturing, also 
in the case of Italy. Based on a large sample of Italian new-born firms in five business groups in the 
hospitality industry, the evidence suggests that growth rates are, in fact, independent of firm size in 
two business groups, while Gibrat’s Law is rejected for the remaining three business groups and for 
the industry as a whole. These mixed results concerning Gibrat’s Law in the services are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the dynamics of industrial organisation for services may not simply mirror 
that for manufacturing. Besides, the findings in this paper support the hypothesis that any general 
conclusion concerning Gibrat's Law cannot be reached without considering heterogeneity, at least 
among firms of different industries. 
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1- Introduction 
In a recent paper by Audretsch, Klomp, Thurik and Santarelli (2002) it is shown that, for the 
Dutch services, Gibrat’s Law is generally valid, since the probability of a given proportionate 
change in size during a four-year period turns out to be the same for all firms – regardless of their 
size at the beginning of the period. This finding is at odds with those of most recent studies, based 
almost exclusively upon evidence from manufacturing, showing that the growth rates of surviving 
firms tend to systematically decrease with increasing firm size1.  
The aim of the present paper is to investigate whether the findings of testing Gibrat’s Law 
for incumbent firms in the Dutch hospitality sector are confirmed also for new-born firms in the 
same industry in Italy. Thus, it deals with the so-called post-entry performance of new firms, which 
is a relatively recent strand in the literature on Gibrat’s Law. This line of investigation has so far 
produced a straightforward result for manufacturing: among new-born firms, smaller ones grow 
faster then their larger counterparts, therefore leading to a rejection of Gibrat’s Law. In a previous 
study on Italian services, Santarelli (1997) tested whether Gibrat’s Law also holds for start-ups in 
the whole hospitality aggregate for the twenty Italian regions. From application of Chesher’s (1979) 
method - regressing the deviation of the logarithm of the firm size from the mean of the logarithms 
of the firm sizes at year t (zt) on the similar deviations in the initial year - it turns out that Gibrat’s 
Law cannot be rejected in the case of fourteen out of twenty Italian regions. The present paper adds 
to Santarelli (1997) by breaking down the hospitality industry into five business groups (hotels, 
camping sites, restaurants, cafeterias, and cafes) for each of which separate estimations are carried 
out. It is important to allow for heterogeneity of firms and business groups even in a relatively 
homogeneous industry like the hospitality sector. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the features of the hospitality sector in 
Italy; Section 3 summarises the implications of Gibrat’s Law for firm level studies and contains a 
description of the data; Section 4 presents the empirical results; Section 5 draws some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2-The hospitality sector in Italy 
The types of Italian services we examine in this paper, for the 1989-1994 period, are in the 
hospitality sector, including hotels, camping sites (including holiday centres), restaurants, 
cafeterias, and cafes2. By definition, firms in this industry operate in very small sub-markets, which 
in most cases are likely to adjust in equilibrium to the presence of only a few firms or even a single 
one.  
The Italian hospitality sector is characterised by low levels of concentration and by the 
widespread presence of small firms with fewer than 5 employees. As a consequence, average firm 
size is very small in all the business groups mentioned above, with the sole exception of cafeterias 
(Table 1), in which it is fifteen times larger than in the whole industry. This is mostly due to the fact 
that in the cafeterias business group the 5 largest firms, which control more than 50% of the market, 
are rather big in size. Besides, in this sub-market most firms operate with more than two 
establishments, as it is confirmed by the very high number of establishments (5,833) as compared to 
that of firms (1,535). As a consequence of concentration and the widespread presence of multi-plant 
firms, average firm size in this business group is therefore markedly above that found for the other 
business groups and the industry as a whole.  
                                                           
1
 A detailed survey of empirical studies testing Gibrat’s Law can be found in Audretsch, Klomp, Santarelli and Thurik 
(2002). 
2
 We adopt a somewhat rigid definition of the hospitality industries, which includes the typical activities of lodging 
guests and serving meals and beverages, but excludes travel services. 
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Value added in the hospitality sector (in constant prices) grew slightly over the relevant 
period, when its total contribution to GDP was nearly 3.2%. Decline in value added either at the 
industry level and in the two aggregate business groups for which data are available (Table 2) - 
namely hotels and camping sites on the one side and restaurants, cafes and cafeterias on the other - 
is consistent with views of recessions3 as times of “cleansing”, characterised by a higher likelihood 
of early exit for new-born firms (Boeri and Bellmann, 1995). In particular, the overall industry 
figures reported in the first column of Table 2 show a significant decrease in the growth rates of 
value added since 1991, with a trough in 1993.  
 
Table 1 - The structural features of the hospitality sector in Italy, year 1991  
SBI 1 and business group Number of 
firms 
Number of 
establishments 
Number of 
employees 
Average  
firm size 
Average  
establishment 
size 
55.1 Hotels 25,959 28,145 150,606 5.8 5.4 
55.2 Camping sites 15,612 17,082 35,093 2.2 2.1 
55.3 Restaurants 66,837 70,186 238,162 3.6 3.4 
55.4 Cafes 107,685 113,031 254,775 2.4 2.3 
55.5 Cafeterias 1,535 5,883 46,845 30.5 8.0 
55 Total hospitality 217,628 234,327 725,481 3.3 3.1 
1
 For the SBI-code the "ATECO" of the Statistics Italy (ISTAT) of 1991 is used. 
Source: 7th General Census of Industry and Services, 21st October 1991. 
 
The existing literature suggests that exit is the most common reaction of small newly 
founded firms facing exogenous shocks. Conversely, under the same circumstances, large and 
incumbent firms tend to shrink without leaving the market. It will be therefore interesting to detect 
whether this pro-cyclical pattern of industry performance is confirmed also as far as the new firm 
survival and employment growth patterns are concerned. 
 
Table 2 - Value added at constant (1995) prices in the Italian hospitality sector 
(billions of lira) 
Year Total hospitality Hotels and 
camping sites 
Restaurants, cafes 
and cafeterias 
1988 53,328 …. …. 
1989 53,064 …. …. 
1990 53,819 …. …. 
1991 53,877 …. …. 
1992 53,869 15,239 38,630 
1993 52,936 14,739 38,197 
1994 54,639 15,266 39,372 
1995 55,744 15,707 40,037 
Source: ISTAT, Statistics Italy 
 
3 - Methodology and Data 
  3.1. Gibrat’s Law and the firm size/firm growth relationship 
The basic tenet underlying Gibrat’s Law is that the growth rate of a given firm is 
independent of its initial size at the beginning of the examined period (Gibrat, 1931). In other 
words, “the probability of a given proportionate change in size during a specified period is the same 
                                                           
3
 The period between 1991 and 1993 has been typified in Italy by a significant slowdown in the GDP growth rates. 
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for all firms in a given industry - regardless of their size at the beginning of the period” (Mansfield, 
1962, p. 1031). 
In fact, the empirical test of the law can be carried out using at least three different 
approaches. Firstly, one can assume that Gibrat’s Law holds for all firms in a given sector, 
including those that have exited the industry during the examined period (setting the proportional 
growth rate of disappearing firms equal -100). Secondly, one can postulate that the law holds only 
for firms that survive over the entire time period. If survival is not independent of a firm’s initial 
size - that is that the smaller firms are more likely to exit than their larger counterparts - this 
empirical test can be affected by a sample selection bias and estimates have to take into account this 
possibility. This observation is particularly true with regard to new and small firms, for which the 
hazard rate is generally high (about 10% per year in the first five years of firm’s life cycle, see 
Audretsch, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 1999). Thirdly, one can state that the law only applies to firms 
large enough to have overcome the minimum efficient scale (MES) of a given industry (for 
instance, Simon and Bonini (1958) found a confirmation of Gibrat’s Law for the 500 largest U.S. 
industrial corporations). 
In most manufacturing industries, substantial sunk costs and high capital investment 
determine the presence of high scale economies. Accordingly, the consequences of low or negative 
growth for small firms in such industries are elevated costs, leading to a lower probability of 
survival. As a result of this survival bias, (surviving) small firms in such industries have 
systematically higher rates of growth than their larger counterparts, resulting in a violation of 
Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect. The general finding of empirical studies dealing with such 
industries is that firms’ growth is not equi-proportional, since smaller firms grow at a higher rate 
compared with their larger counterparts.  
The small-firm survival bias, and the resulting violation of Gibrat’s Law, tends to disappear 
in industries with minimal sunk costs and where capital intensity and scale economies do not play 
an important role. In such industries, the consequences of low or even negative growth are 
symmetric between large and small enterprises. Consequently, observed growth rates also are found 
to be independent of firm size. Previous findings on Dutch hospitality (Audretsch, Klomp, 
Santarelli, and Thurik, 2002) support this hypothesis. 
 
   3.2 - Data 
One of the greatest impediments to examining the relationship between firm size and growth 
has been the lack of access to longitudinal data sets. This paucity of data has been even more 
exacerbated for services. In this paper we rely on the Italian National Institute for Social Security  
(INPS) to track the growth performance of firms in the Italian hospitality sector between 1989 and 
1994. All private Italian firms are compelled to transfer to INPS national security payments for their 
employees; when a new firm is registered as “active” in INPS files an entry can be identified, while 
a firm cancellation denotes an “exit” (this happens when a firm ultimately stops paying national 
security fees). A limitation of the database is represented by the fact that no information on firms 
with zero paid employees is available from the INPS file; however, these firms usually identify self-
employment and only occasionally become true entrants with positive post-entry employment 
growth rates.  
In industries, such as the hospitality services, in which production activity is strongly 
affected by seasonal factors, a significant number of firms suspend temporarily operations for a few 
or many months during each year: accordingly, they result as “suspended”, but cannot be taken as 
“exited”, since they are not cancelling their position from the INPS files. Sometimes - for 
administrative reasons - cancellation is preceded by a period during which the firm results as 
“suspended”. In the present paper, suspended firms of this kind have been considered as “exited” at 
the moment (month) of their transition from the status of “active” to that of “suspended” firm. 
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Besides, the original INPS file was subjected to further checking, in order to identify entry and 
failure times correctly and to detect inconsistencies in individual tracks due to administrative 
factors, problems related to file truncation in January 1993, cancellations due to firm transfers, 
mergers and take-overs. Finally, all firms for which information on their main activity was 
forthcoming were inserted into the five different categories, which typically define the industry: 
restaurants, cafeterias, cafes, hotels and camping sites. The overall cleaning procedure reduced the 
total number of firms in the database from 11,720 to 9,051 (-22.77%)4. Thus, the data set employed 
for empirical analysis identifies 9,051 new tourism services firms (with at least one paid employee) 
born in 1989 and tracks their post-entry employment performance at yearly intervals until 1994. No 
information on firms with zero paid employees is available from the INPS file, and it is not possible 
to know if a firm consists of more than one establishment. 
According to the first frame (“Firm survival”) of Table 3, the survival rates of new start-ups 
comprised in our analysis is particularly low since immediately after entry. With the sole exception 
of hotels and camping sites, in all business groups and in the industry as a whole nearly two third of 
new start-ups leave the market during the first six years of activity. This evidence is in sharp 
contrast with that for manufacturing, in which the percentage of firms leaving the market is of 
approximately 40 percent (cf., among others, Audretsch, Santarelli, and Vivarelli, 1999).  
As the second frame (“Employment dynamics”) of Table 3 clearly shows, in close 
connection to the dramatic market selection reported in the first frame of the same table, all the 
cohorts are characterised by a negative employment evolution. In fact, the combined effects of the 
exits of the less efficient firms and of the growth of the surviving firms are unable to impose a 
positive trend in the employment evolution in all the business groups. Opposite to the findings 
found by Lotti, Santarelli and Vivarelli (2001) for Italian start-ups in manufacturing, this means that 
market selection does involve - in the hospitality sector - a decrease in employment. 
This evidence suggests that both the likelihood of survival and employment growth among 
new-born firms in this industry are likely to follow a pro-cyclical pattern, consistently with the 
dynamics of value added commented upon in Section 2.  
 
Table 3 – Survival rates and number of employees, by business group and year 
 Firm survival  Employment dynamics 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
 Absolute value  Absolute value 
Hotels 1,395 1,193 1,065 959 874 781  6,403 5,876 6,101 6,011 5,512 5,082 
Camping sites 79 62 51 48 45 40  231 176 236 275 321 350 
Restaurants 3,276 2,652 2,121 1,808 1,548 1,300  7,582 6,381 5,757 5,245 4,644 4,100 
Cafes 3,625 2,841 2,150 1,770 1,486 1,227  6,318 5,240 4,473 4,006 3,468 3,005 
Cafeterias 676 525 407 331 282 240  1,464 1,257 895 839 767 744 
Total hospitality 9,051 7,273 5,794 4,916 4,235 3,588  21,998 18,930 17,462 16,376 14,712 13,281 
 Percentages  Percentages 
Hotels - 85.5 76.3 68.7 62.7 56.0  - 91.8 95.3 93.9 86.1 79.4 
Camping sites - 78.5 64.6 60.8 57.0 50.6  - 76.2 102.2 119.0 139.0 151.5 
Restaurants - 81.0 64.7 55.2 47.3 39.7  - 84.2 75.9 69.2 61.3 54.1 
Cafes - 78.4 59.3 48.8 41.0 33.8  - 82.9 70.8 63.4 54.9 47.6 
Cafeterias - 77.7 60.2 49.0 41.7 35.5  - 85.9 61.1 57.3 52.4 50.8 
Total hospitality - 80.4 64.0 54.3 46.8 39.6  - 86.1 79.4 74.4 66.9 60.4 
 
As first Mansfield (1962) and later Sutton (1997) point out, the discrepancy in conclusions 
about the validity of Gibrat’s Law emanates from following the three different approaches – all firms, 
                                                           
4
 These start-up firms constitute approximately, for year 1989, 5.9% of the Hotels business group, 0.5% of Camping 
sites, 4.9% of Restaurants, 3.6% of Cafes, 44% of Cafeterias (a rather new activity in Italy at the end of the 1980s), and 
4.5% of the entire Hospitality industry. 
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only surviving firms, and only large firms (that exceed the MES level of output) - described in Section 
3.1 above. To ensure that the results in this paper are not slanted towards any one of these approaches, 
we were able to create two different samples. The first sample consists of all firms. We follow the 
earlier studies by assigning a growth rate of −100 to any firm that exited between 1989 and 1994. The 
second sample consists only of firms that survived the entire period between 1989 and 1994. About 
60 percent of the firms in existence in 1989 are not in existence by 1994. The resulting survival rates 
are not significantly different from those identified for manufacturing and business services in Italy 
(Santarelli and Sterlacchini, 1991; Piergiovanni and Santarelli, 1995). Thus, cyclical factors may not 
be more significant for the post-entry performance of new firms in the hospitality industry than they 
are in other industries. Due to the nature of firms included in our analysis - all new entrants with a 
start-up size that by definition is far below the industry MES level of output - it was not possible to 
construct a third sample consisting only of large surviving firms. 
The original database tracks employment on a monthly base. However, we decided to use 
average employment in each year, in order to smooth the peaks that emerge for firms that hire paid 
employees for short periods (e.g. during summer) due to the seasonal character of their business. 
Accordingly, firm size in each year is represented by the average number of employees in the twelve 
months. 
The mean growth rates, measured as the percentage change in firm employment size between 
1989 and 1994 are shown for each of these two samples in Table 4. The mean growth rate for the 
9,051 firms in the sample consisting of all firms is -39.60 percent and ranged from -52.40 percent in 
cafes to 51.50 percent for camping sites. For the sample consisting of only the 3,588 surviving firms 
the mean growth rate is considerably higher, 26.00 percent. 
 
Table 4 - Firm size and growth rates by business group and year for the period 1989-1994 
Business Group Version 11  Version 22 
 Growth3 Size4 N5  Growth3 Size4 N5 
Hotels -20.6 4.59 1,395  26.8 5.13 781 
Camping sites 51.5 2.92 79  150.0 3.5 40 
Restaurants -45.9 2.31 3,276  24.5 2.53 1,300 
Cafes -52.4 1.74 3,625  15.4 2.12 1,227 
Cafeterias -49.2 2.17 676  50.6 2.06 240 
Total hospitality -39.6 2.43 9,051  26.0 2.94 3,588 
1
 In the first version all firms are included. If a firm exits between 1989 and 1994 the growth rate (over the six-year period) is 
equated to − 100. 
2
 In the second version all firms that survived during the period 1989-1994 are included. 
3
 Firm growth rate measured by the average percentage of change in employment per firm for the period 1989-1994. 
4
 Firm start-up size measured by the average employment per firm in 1989. 
5
 N stands for the number of observations. 
 
 
4 - Empirical results 
A way of characterising the studies testing Gibrat’s Law is: static studies versus studies 
analysing the persistence of growth. Mansfield (1962) is an example of a static approach, while 
Chesher’s study (1979) is an example of a temporal analysis.  
Both static and temporal analyses of the two versions of Gibrat’s Law would lead to four 
specifications of modelling empirical growth. However, the first version of the Law cannot be 
estimated in the case of persistence of growth, since it is not possible to analyse the persistence of 
growth for firms that leave the industry during the observation period. 
 
  4.1. Distribution of Firm Growth Rates  
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The first method used to test for the validity of Gibrat’s Law in the literature divides the 
observed firm sizes into several size classes and then examines whether firm growth rates are equally 
distributed across these classes. See Hymer and Pashigian (1962), Singh and Whittington (1975) and 
Acs and Audretsch (1990) for examples. To construct such size classes firms were ranked according 
to employment size in the initial year (1989) and divided into quartiles in each business group in the 
hospitality sector. Similarly, firm average growth rates over the entire 1989-1994 period were also 
divided into quartiles. If the observed frequencies of the resulting sixteen cells in the cross tables of 
firm size and growth rates are equal, Gibrat’s Law would be supported. Whether or not growth rates 
and firm size are independent is tested using the χ2 statistic.5 
The results for the two different versions of Gibrat’s Law are presented in Table 5. Gibrat’s 
Law is rejected in three of the five business groups for the sample including all firms (version 1 in 
Table 3), in which for the cafeterias and the camping sites size and growth are found to be 
statistically independent. For the sample containing only surviving firms the Law is accepted for the 
camping sites, but is rejected for the remaining business groups (version 2). However, it is worth 
noting that in the sample composed only by survivors, firms with a start-up size equal to 1 are not 
allowed to experience negative growth rates. As a consequence, the empirical results from 
application of the χ2 statistic to version 2 of Gibrat's Law are likely to be severely biased. 
 
Table 5 - Empirical results for Gibrat’s Law, which state that firm growth rates are distributed 
independently of firm size 
 Hotels Camping sites Restaurants Cafes Cafeterias Hospitality 
 All firms (version 1) 
χ2 value 97.106 7.992 42.001 111.144 8.114 197.456 
Degrees of freedom 9 9 6 4 4 6 
Level of significance 0.000 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.087 0.000 
 Survived firms (version 2) 
χ2 value 104.246 16.776 461.159 30.452 27.061 1371.103 
Degrees of freedom 9 9 9 4 4 9 
Level of significance 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 In the first version all firms are included. If a firm exits between 1989 and 1994 the growth rate (over the four-year period) is 
equated to − 100. 
2 In the second version all firms that survived during the period 1989-1994 are included. 
 
  4.2. Persistence of Growth  
In this section the other main methodology used to estimate Gibrat’s Law is employed to test 
the hypothesis that firm growth is independent of size. In effect, one implication of Gibrat's Law is 
that it holds only if persistence of firm growth rate is observed (Singh and Whittington, 1975). 
Otherwise, if growth turns out to be an autocorrelated process, the law cannot be accepted. As 
developed by Chesher (1979),  
zt,i = β zt-1,i + εt,i,          (1) 
where t is an index for time, i is an index for the firms, and zt,i is the deviation of the logarithm 
of the size of company i at time t from the mean of the logarithms of the sizes of companies at time t 
(zt-1,i is analogously defined). 
If Gibrat’s Law is valid and firm growth rates are distributed independently of firm size, the 
parameter β should be equal to unity. If β ≤ 1 large firms are expected to grow more slowly than their 
smaller counterparts; if β ≥ 1 small firms are expected to grow more slowly than larger enterprises. 
                                                           
5
 To test for independence in the cross tables, the expected value of each cell in the table is at least five. To obtain these 
expected values we use only two or three classes of size and growth when the number of observations in a table is fewer 
than 80. 
 8
Equation (1) assumes that the disturbances, εt,i, are serially uncorrelated. In the case of serially 
correlated disturbances the firm growth rate in one period depends on the growth rate in the preceding 
period. See Amirkhalkhali and Mukhopadhyay (1993) for an explanation. Thus, Gibrat’s Law can be 
rejected even when the parameter β is (about) equal to one.6 Assuming a first order autoregressive 
process for the disturbances εt,i 
εt,i = ρ εt,i + νt,i         (2) 
where νt,i is assumed to be non-serially correlated. Expressing the disturbances εt,i and εt-1,i in 
terms of zt,i, zt-1,i, and zt-1,i and zt-2,i respectively, 
zt,i = (β + ρ) zt-1,i + (−βρ) zt-2,i + νt,i,       (3) 
We use the non-linear regression procedure by Marquardt (1963) to obtain (asymptotic) 
standard errors for β and ρ. Gibrat’s Law is considered to be valid if the joint hypothesis (β ρ) = (1 0) 
is accepted. Assuming that the estimators of β and ρ are asymptotically normally distributed, the test-
statistic for the joint hypothesis is (asymptotically) chi-squared distributed with two degrees of 
freedom. See Malinvaud (1980). 
The estimation results for equation (3) are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 - Empirical results for equation (3): zt,i = (β + ρ) zt-1,i + (−βρ) zt-2,i + νt,i, t = 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 
 z94 z93 z92 z91  z94 z93 z92 z91 
 
Hotels  Cafes 
β 0.9793 0.9583 0.9697 0.9804  0.9407 0.9415 0.9635 0.9623 
 
(0.0086) (0.0104) (0.0108) (0.0143)  (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0116) 
ρ -0.2663 -0.2338 -0.1920 -0.0139  -0.0294 -0.0769 -0.0954 -0.1305 
 
(0.0313) (0.0384) (0.0349) (0.0330)  (0.0320) (0.0308) (0.0317) (0.0286) 
χ2 69.639** 66.611** 67.573** 65.662**  48.628** 47.966** 47.125** 43.579** 
 
Camping sites  Cafeterias 
β 1.0555 1.0035 1.0776 1.0628  0.9467 0.9281 0.9419 0.9872 
 
(0.0432) (0.0831) (0.0708) (0.0678)  (0.0263) (0.0256) (0.0341) (0.0303) 
ρ -0.3143 -0.1062 -0.2851 -0.7988  -0.1444 -0.0208 0.0221 -0.0560 
 
(0.1193) (0.2228) (0.1307) (0.1842)  (0.0873) (0.0649) (0.0809) (0.0696) 
χ2 4.766 3.673 3.196 2.520  10.473** 10.560* 10.393* 9.646* 
 
Restaurants  Total hospitality 
β 0.9471 0.9458 0.9529 0.9371  0.9609 0.9500 0.9631 0.9668 
 
(0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0130) (0.0158)  (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0075) 
ρ -0.0832 -0.0725 -0.1256 0.0180  -0.1379 -0.1163 -0.1323 -0.0550 
 
(0.0295) (0.0288) (0.0305) (0.0321)  (0.0171) (0.0062) (0.0177) (0.0173) 
χ2 52.639** 50.546** 46.805** 42.206**  185.81** 179.225** 174.970** 163.139** 
1
 In equation (3) Gibrat’s Law holds when the joint hypothesis (β ρ) = (1 0) is accepted. The test-statistic for this joint hypothesis is 
(asymptotically) χ2 distributed with two degrees of freedom.  
2
 Asymptotic standard errors are given between parentheses. 
* The hypothesis β=1 or the hypothesis ρ=0 or Gibrat’s Law is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance. 
** The hypothesis β=1 or the hypothesis ρ=0 or Gibrat’s Law is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance. 
 
With our data, Gibrat’s Law is accepted only for the camping sites business group and for 
all four time-periods for which analysis is carried out. Conversely, in the remaining 20 cases the 
                                                           
6
 The condition that parameter β is equal to one is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Gibrat’s Law to be true. 
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Law cannot be accepted. The results for each of the five business groups are stable in the 
observation period. 
The results obtained from estimation of the static and the dynamic versions of Gibrat’s Law 
for newly founded firms in the service sector (Tables 5 and 6) are consistent with each other. 
Gibrat’s Law holds for camping sites and is rejected for hotels, cafes, and restaurants. The results 
for cafeterias are somewhat ambiguous. The Law is rejected for version 1 in Table 5, but rejected 
for version 2 in Table 5 as well in Table 6. The test statistic in Table 6 is, however, relatively low.  
 
5 - Conclusions 
The results of this paper show that in some business groups in Italian hospitality services  
smaller ones among new-born firms tend to have systematically higher growth rates that their larger 
counterparts, while for other business groups firm growth rates are independent of firm size. This 
mixed evidence contrasts with the large majority of previous studies dealing only with 
manufacturing concluding that Gibrat’s Law, i.e., firm growth rates are independent of firm size, is 
rejected (Singh and Whittington, 1975, Chesher, 1979, and Wagner, 1992). Our results confirm the 
findings by Audretsch, Klomp, Santarelli and Thurik (2002) that industry dynamics in the services 
might not simply mirror that in manufacturing. 
Following the evolutionary perspective pointed out by Audretsch (1995) one may assume 
that new firm start-ups as well as larger incumbent firms are likely to contribute in a different 
manner to the dynamics of different industries. See also Audretsch and Fritsch (2002). In this 
connection, a distinction can be made between an entrepreneurial regime, more favourable to 
innovative entry and unfavourable to established firms, and a routinised regime, characterised by 
opposite conditions. See Audretsch and Thurik (2000 and 2001). Accordingly, industry-specific 
characteristics, such as scale economies and the endowment of innovative capabilities, exert a 
significant impact on entry, exit, and the likelihood of survival of new start-ups. For example, in 
manufacturing industries characterised by higher minimum efficient scale (MES) levels of output, 
smaller entrants face higher costs that are likely to push them out of the market within a short period 
after start-up unless they are able to grow very fast. Conversely, smaller entrants might not be at a 
disadvantage in certain industries in the services sector, within with the process of industry 
dynamics is therefore different from that in manufacturing. See Audretsch, van Leeuwen, Menkveld 
and Thurik (2001). In this connection, the findings in the present paper open the way to further 
research on the possible differences in the behaviour of Gibrat’s Law moving from manufacturing 
to the service sector. 
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